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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
STANLEY D. ROSE *
There was a tide in the affairs of men that was taken at its flood by the
National Association of Retail Druggists-and it led on to fortune. For this
band of little men the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act I was
the end of a thirty years war. Enjoined in 1907 from attempting to force up,
retail price margins and maintain retail drug prices at a uniform level, 2 this,
association joined with other groups desirous of achieving similar ends in an
effort, year after year, to persuade Congress to permit the making of contracts
between manufacturers and retailers that would fix minimum resale prices.
With the beginning of the depression in the thirties, the Association shifted
its efforts to the states, where the first success in retail price control came with
the passage of the California Fair Trade Act in 1931. 3 In the ten succeeding
years 45 states 4 passed resale price maintenance laws -the so-called Fair
Trade Acts-and the Federal Government bestowed its blessing on such laws
when the contracts they legitimated concerned goods in the course of com-
merce.6
This tremendous measure of success, legislative as well as judicial, should
raise a presumption of merit. And yet influential organizations have not only
withheld their approbation but have expressly disapproved the principles upon
which all this legislation is based. The Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee 7 and the Department of Justice 8 have recommended the repeal of the
Miller-Tydings Act. The Federal Trade Commission in a lengthy study dem-
onstrated the undesirable effects of the laws.9 President Roosevelt on three
* Attorney, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice. Former Note Editor, VAN-
DERBILT LAW REVIEW.
The views expressed in this article are personal to the writer and are not necessarily
those of the Department of Justice.
1. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1946).
2. United States v. National Association of Retail Druggists (C. C. Ind. May 9,
1907). The decree is reprinted in DECREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST
CASES, JULY 2, 1890-JAN. 1, 1918, 115 (1918).
3. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 278.
4. Fair Trade laws have been passed in every state except Missouri, Vermont, Texas
and the District of Columbia. The texts of the various acts will be found most conveniently
in 2 CCH TRADE REG. 111 8000 et seq. (1949).
5. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
xxvii (1945). The report will hereinafter be cited as FTC REPORT (1945).
6. See note I supra.
7. FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL EcoNoMIc
COMMITTEE 33 (1941). This report will hereinafter be cited as TNEC FINAL REPORT
(1941).
8. Testimony of Herbert A. Bergson, Assistant Attorney General, before the Sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee, July 27, 1949.
9. FTC REPORT lxiv (1945). The Commission had indicated its disapproval of this
type of legislation in a previous report. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT ON RESALE
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occasions publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with this type of legislation.10
Last spring, the Florida Supreme Court overturned the Fair Trade Act of
that state." These are all signs that the tide of affairs may be changing and
that perhaps the fortunes of resale price maintenance are declining. In any
event, the subject seems important enough to merit another consideration. Ad-
mittedly there are already thousands of articles and hundreds of arguments
on the subject. 12 Yet the field must be revisited again and again. Since 1911,
when the real debate on resale price maintenance in this country began, the
forces in opposition have always been weak numerically. If all this legislation
is actually the work of pressure groups-and, as will be seen, this is a justi-
fiable claim,-then the best means of reversing the process of the last two
decades is to alert those whose interests are adversely affected.
THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
Resale price maintenance is one form of legislation dealing with prices.
The various state statutes passed to reach this particular result not only do
the same thing, they also do it the same way. They legalize contracts which
may 13 be made between manufacturers of trademarked goods and their re-
tailers for the purpose of setting either the only price or the minimum price at
which the retailer may resell the commodities. The commodities involved are
trademarked goods only or commodities which bear the name of the producer.
1 4
These laws do not relate to patented 15 or copyrighted goods.16 To be the
PRICE MAINTENANCE, PART II, 165 (1931). This report will hereinafter be cited as FTC
REPORT, PART II (1931).
10. When Congress was holding hearings on the bifls that later became the Miller-
Tydings Act, President Roosevelt requested Congress to forego consideration of the
bills and to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to make further studies of the sub-
ject. 81 CONG. REc. 3838 (1937). When the Miller-Tydings Act was passed as a rider to
the District of Columbia appropriations bill, the reluctance of the President's approval
was evident. N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1937, p. 26, col. 1. In 1939, when a Senate committee
was considering a Fair Trade Act for the District of Columbia, the President wrote to
Vice-President Garner asking that the Senate delay action on this bill until after the
TNEC and the FTC had completed their studies of the problem. 84 CONG. REC. 6114
(1939).
11. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
12. See Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 181, 4 S. E. 2d 528, 125 A. L. R.
1308 (1939).
13. The permissive character of the statutory' legalization of these contracts must be
emphasized. A number of states have compulsory resale price maintenance laws governing
the sale of liquor in such states. See Note, Compulsory Resale Price Maintenance in
Liquor: A New York Experiment in Controlled Competition, 57 YALE L. J. 459 (1948).
Section 17 of the New York Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, authorizing the State
Liquor Authority, in its discretion, to prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages by
retailers except pursuant to Fair Trade contracts was declared an invalid delegation of
legislative authority. Levine v. O'Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (1st
Dep't 1949).
14. The first of a series of processors may not fix the final resale price even
though the article before processing is trademarked. United States v. Univis Lens
Co., 316 U. S. 241, 62 Sup. Ct. 1088, 86 L. Ed. 1408 (1942).
15. Where a patentee makes the patented article and sells it, he can exercise no
future control over the article after such sale. It has passed beyond the scope of the
patentee's rights. Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct.
1949)
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subject of retail price maintenance contracts, merchandise must be.in free
and open or fair and open competition with other goods of the same class
manufactured by persons other than the contracting parties.17
The competition that the drafters of the state bills had in mind was called
horizontal competition. The contract prices may not be fixed by horizontal
agreements between manufacturers or between wholesalers. Vertical agree-
ments down the distribution hierarchy, however, are being legalized by these
contracts. The nature of the arguments concerning the propriety of ruling out
this vertical competition will be discussed later.
The conditions under which there may be deviations from the prices
fixed in the contracts are expressly stated in the statutes. They are, with a few
minor exceptions, 18 limited to four, and not all the states have even these four.
Exemptions are permitted (1) at a bona fide closing out sale and if the pro-
ducer is given an opportunity to repurchase, (2) when the goods are damaged
or deteriorated and notice of such condition is given to the public, (3) if the
sale is being made by an officer under a court order, and (4) when the trade-
mark or name has been obliterated.' 9
The most unusual feature of these acts is the nonsigner clause. The
wording of it is almost exactly the same in all 45 statutes. The original and
still standard form was introduced in the 1933 Amendment to the 1931 Cali-
fornia Fair Trade Act.20 This clause provides that:
"Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at
less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the provision of
27, 62 L. Ed. 551 (1918); Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616,
57 L. Ed. 1041 (1913). But if the patentee licenses the patent and permits the sale
of the product under the license, the patentee as licensor may limit or fix the selling
price set by the licensee. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47
Sup. Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926), approving Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186
U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747, 46 L. Ed. 1058 (1902). This may appear to be a simple
condition attached to the license, but query: What is the difference between a sale
and a license to manufacture and sell that permits resale price maintenance in the
latter and not in the former? The General Electric case, supra, seems certain to be
overruled. See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 68 Sup. Ct. 550, 92
L. Ed. 701 (1948), 1 VAND. L. REv. 664. If the patent is invalid, the price-fixing arrange-
ment with the licensee is illegal. Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Co., 329 U. S. 394,
67 Sup. Ct. 416, 91 L. Ed. 374 (1947). When several licensees are involved, the arrange-
ments are closely scrutinized because the result must inevitably be a price-fixing arrange-
ment likely to substantially lessen competition. United States v. Line Material Co., supra at
.315. See also United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377, 71 L.
Ed. 700 (1927).
16. To secure to the author the exclusive right to multiply copies of his work is
the main purpose of the copyright statutes, but this does not give the author the right
to fix the subsequent resale price. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U. S. 339, 28 Sup.
Ct. 722, 52 L. Ed. 1086 (1908). Books may be covered by Fair Trade contracts if
they bear the name of the publisher.
17. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 158 F. 2d 592 (2d Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 828 (1947), 15 GFo. WASH. L. REv. 511.
18. Tennessee exempts sales of books to libraries located within the state. TENN.
CoDE ANN. § 6770.4a (Williams. Supp. 1948).
19. An analysis by states of these exemptions is contained in 2 CCH TRAD, Rvc
1 7012 (1949).
20. Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 260. amending Cal. Stats., 1931, c. 278.
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Section 1 of this Act, whether the person so advertising, offering for sale or selling is
or is not a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit
of any person damaged thereby."
This provision obviously binds non-contracting parties to the price
stipulated in the contract. It was destined to arouse strong feeling, and its
validity will be discussed later in this article.
In the last fifteen years there have been passed by State and Federal
governments a number of different types of statutes expressly dealing with
prices. These will be briefly mentioned here and distinguished from the Fair
Trade Acts.
The Robinson-Patman Act,21 passed in 1936 as an amendment to the
Clayton Act, forbade any discrimination in price between different purchasers
of commodities of like grade and quality when such goods were in the course
of interstate commerce and tle discrimination tended to prevent or lessen
competition or create a monopoly. By express proviso, differentials were per-
mitted which make due allowance only for differences in the cost of manu-
facture, sale or delivery resulting from differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are sold or delivered to purchasers. This act was aimed at
chain stores and mail order houses. 22 It was designed to protect the small
retailer from the giants of distribution,23 and in this fact alone is there any
connection between the Robinson-Patman Act and the Fair Trade Acts. Both
have had an effect upon vertical competition: the former in the cost to the
retailer, and the latter, in the retail price itself.
A substantial number of states have enacted Unfair Sales Acts or Unfair
Practices Acts.24 These statutes refer to all merchandise sold at retail, and
some are written in very terse language. For example, the New Jersey statute
simply says: "It is hereby declared that the advertisement, offer for sale, or
sale of any merchandise at less than cost by retailers is prohibited." 25 Other,
perhaps more sophisticated, legislatures have qualified the prohibition some-
what.26 The linkage by statute between prices and retailing costs as an account-
ing problem, is of doubtful practicality. 27 The constitutionality of the attempt
21. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1941).
22. McLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patinan Act: Possibilities of Strict
Construction, 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 410, 413 (1937); Note, Trouble Begins in:
the "New" Sherman Act: The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 YALE L. J.
969, 970 (1949). For a more conservative view of the Act, see PATIIAN, THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN AcT (1938).
23. McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs and the Robinson-Patinan Act, 4
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 334 (1937).
24. For an excellent note on this subject, see Note, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions:
Private Price Fixing Under State Law, 57 YALE L. J. 391 (1948).
25. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 56:4-8 (1940).
26. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6770.8 (Williams, 1941).27. Note, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions, supra note 24, at 396; Hamilton, Cost as
a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMP..PROB. 321 (1937).
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is also doubtful, although the challenges have not been many.2 8 Opponents u f
resale price maintenance have upon occasion argued that if the proponents of
such legislation were being frank in stating their grievances, then price floors
at the point of costs would be the solution of all their troubles; and a number
of such opponents would have gone along with such legislation, even though
they would not support the Fair Trade contracts.2 9 These statutes were de-
pression-born and represent another method used to protect the small retailer.
Basically the arguments advanced for and against such statutes are the same
as are used in the Fair Trade debate, but the two types of legislation should
be kept clearly distinguished, because all was not said that was meant or de-
signed.
It is anticipated that the courts will strictly construe these pricing statutes.
The Univis Lens case is an example. 30 Another is Mennen Co. v. Krauss Co.,"'
in which a federal district court considered the Louisiana Fair Trade law. As
will be seen later, there are two distinct types of Fair Trade laws in which resale
price maintenance contracts are legalized. The Louisiana statute permitted
contracts in which the buyer agreed not to sell commodities except at prices
stipulated by the vendor. In the Mennen case, the court declared invalid con-
tracts in which the buyer agreed not to resell at less than a stipulated minimum
price. This case is of interest because the contracts invalidated were of the type
recognized by the Miller-Tydings Act, which speaks only of contracts "pre-
scribing minimum prices for the resale of a commodity."
This survey of pricing laws was undertaken to limit the background pre-
paratory to an extended consideration of the Fair Trade laws. The following
study will first consider the legal foundation of the problem to show why all
this legislation was necessary. The history of the organized drive to legalize
retail price maintenance will then be considered. In the process of tracing this
history, the arguments of the proponents of the laws will be examined. The end
of the story will be to indicate the proper place within a competitive economy
of the Fair Trade movement. What was illegal without statute may, of course.
become legal with legislation. This is what happened with the Fair Trade laws.
28. Thatcher, The Constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Acts, 30 MINN. L. REv.
559 (1946).
29. Hearings before Judiciary Committee on H. R. 1611, 75th Cong.. Ist Sess.
103, 110, 167 (1937) (Hereinafter cited as "Hearing on H. R. 1611 (1937)"). Senator
Tydings declared that he wanted to eliminate loss-leader selling, but that he avoided
proposing a bill that would prohibit sales below costs because (1) few states had such
laws, (2) there was doubt as to the constitutionality of such laws, and (3) such laws
could not be made permissive. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 100, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1937) (Hereinafter cited as "Hearings
on S. 100 (1937)").
30. 316 U. S. 241, 62 Sup. Ct. 1088, 86 L. Ed. 1408 (1942).
31. 37 F. Supp. 161 (E. D. La. 1941). In spite of the strict construction, one
writer expects that the nonsigner clauses of the state statutes will be read into the
Miller-Tydings Act, because without such an interpretation the Act would be valueless.
Callmann, "Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. OF PiTr. L. Rav. 443, 453 (1949).
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The legal problem being momentarily resolved, the major consideration today
centers about the wisdom of these laws.
THE LEGAL BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE LEGISLATION
What was later to be termed the "Miles Park blunder" 32 precipitated
national discussion of resale price maintenance. The Dr. Miles Medical Com-
pany tried by a thinly disguised attempt at retention of title to control the final
resale price of their medicines. In 1911, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park &
Sons Co.,33 Justice Hughes, speaking for the Supreme Court, told the company
that it could not legally continue its efforts at control of the price of its product
to the final consumer. The company's contracts were illegal both as a restraint
upon alienation and as a restraint of trade. No special public interest was to be
served by permitting these contracts. The Court declared that "The complain-
ant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public is entitled
to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the subsequent
traffic." 34
An unexpected voice appeared in dissent in this case. Justice Holmes de-
clared that the Court's opinion was not based upon statute or authority and was
merely judicial policy making. The company appeared to be charging reason-
able prices, and certainly the public would not benefit from "knaves" 35 cutting
these prices. Prices are determined by conflicting desires anyway and there
was no evident reason why the Court should interfere with these contracts.
The force of the prose of Justice Holmes struck a note that was to be repeated
at almost every subsequent hearing upon the subject of resale price mainte-
nance.
It should be noted that in this leading case both sides were well represented
and that, as was always to -be the case, no issue was joined. Justice Hughes
opposed resale price maintenance contracts because they were in restraint of
trade. He paid no heed to the commercial practices that allegedly made such
contracts desirable. Justice Holmes spent no great time discussing the effect
of such contracts upon competition; he simply believed these devices to be
legitimate methods df preventing unfair competitive practices. The majority
32. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 13 (1937).
33. 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911). The Court gave express
approval to Judge Lurton's opinion in Park & Sons v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24 (6th Cir.
1907). Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88, 9 Sup. Ct. 658, 33 L. Ed. 67 (1889), was declared
in the Dr. Miles case (220 U. S. at 402) to stand for the proposition that the secret
process itself may be burdened with restrictions as to territory or prices. The case
seems readable as a situation similar to the Dr. Miles case which forbade restrictions on
the products manufactured from the process.
34. 220 U. S. at 409.
35. "I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court
permitting knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and
thus to impair, if not to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed




of the Court would have argued that it was no part of the Court's task to con-
sider the wisdom or the desirability of these contracts. They would then be
faced with a rule that a few months later this same Court was to announce:
that only unreasonable restraints of trade were in violation of the Sherman
Act.86 The majority evidently thought these contracts were unreasonable re-
straints of trade. This is actually the one issue. If it be true that all price cutters
are "knaves," then efforts to control them might well be regarded as reasonable.
The truth of the claim that all price cutters are dishonest has been generally
assumed by the proponents of resale price maintenance, but the studies that
are available do not support the claim nor does it stand up upon analysis. This
point is discussed later in this article, where an extended consideration is given
to the arguments for legislation on this form of price control.
The Dr. Miles case aroused a great deal of opposition. Louis D. Brandeis,
then a Boston attorney, called the decision "judicial legislation." 37 One writer
pointed out that Justice Hughes in the Dr. Miles case failed to consider the
distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements. 38 Again the assump-
tion is evident that vertical agreements are permissible.39 This assumption,
it should be clear, begs the very question at issue. If vertical agreements were
per se valid, these resale price maintenance contracts might be valid. But are
vertical agreements valid, especially when designed to fix prices? 40 A more
practical result traceable to this case was the formation in 1913 by a group
of manufacturers of the American Fair Trade League, of which Brandeis
was certainly the intellectual leader.4' Less than a year later, the Stevens bill
was introduced into Congress. This bill would have legalized contracts be-
tween manufacturers and retailers to fix the retail sale price. The fate of this
and subsequent bills will be considered later, but it was certain that until such
a bill was passed, price maintenance contracts would be invalid. This certainty
came from the action of the Supreme Court in reaffirming, whenever it could,
its stand in the Dr. Miles case.4 2
36. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 63, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed.
619 (1911).
37. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition That Kills, HARPER'S WEEKLY 11(Nov. 15, 1913). See also Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices, 63 U.
OF PA. L. Rav. 22 (1914). The failure to consider practical business conditions is
scored in Waite, Public Policy and Personal Opinion, 19 Mica. L. REv. 265, 280 (1921).
38. Sayre; Maintenance of Resale Prices, 6 ORE. L. REv. 241 (1927).
39. The extent to which chattels may be burdened with restrictive covenants is
discussed in Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928);
Wade, Restrictions on User, 44 L. Q. REV. 51 (1928).
40. In dissenting from an opinion upholding the state Fair Trade law, a Wash-
ington judge said: "It is only by the judicial invention of such artificial formulae as
'vertical arrangements' and 'horizontal arrangements' that the plain provisions of
the constitution are circumvented." Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, 10 Wash. 2d 372,
392, 116 P. 2d 756, 765 (1941).
41. FTC REPORT 43-44 (1945).
42. Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 412, 61
L. Ed. 866 (1917) ; United States v. A Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85, 40 Sup. Ct.
251, 64 L. Ed. 471 (1920).
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But surely, it will be said, a manufacturer has a right to do something to
protect himself from the "knaves" who cut prices. The extent of the powers
of a producer in this respect, as one court has said, "may rightly be said to be
in confusion." 43
The most extreme power that a producer of trademarked goods has at
his disposal is the right to refuse to deal with a retailer who will not maintain
prices suggested or recommended by such a producer. Justice McReynolds,
speaking for the Court in United States v. Colgate & Co.,44 declared that in
the absence of. any intent to" create a monopoly,45 the Sherman Act does not
prevent a manufacturer from announcing in advance the prices at which his
goods may be resold and that such a manufacturer may refuse to deal with
wholesalers or retailers who do not conform to such prices. 46 One writer has
called this power to refuse to sell a power to boycott,47 but this seems to be a
misnomer.48 A priori, it would not seem conducive to happiness to advise a
harried manufacturer that he need not sell to a recalcitrant retailer. It appears
all too evident that this technique of controlling retailers is likely to be available
only to the larger producers and, as such, is apt to become an instrument for
furthering a monopolistic position.4 9
These are the two ends of this particular problem. A manufacturer may
not make contracts with a retailer to maintain retail prices, but such a manu-
facturer may refuse to sell to a retailer who does not maintain suggested retail
prices. The surprising fact now emerges that there is no middle ground. A
manufacturer may give warning of a refusal to sell unless retail prices are
maintained, 50 but almost every other form of affirmative action taken by a
producer to keep up the resale prices of his product is invalid. The Beechnut
Company had an elaborate system, aggressively enforced, of checking on its
retailers and weeding out those who cut prices. The retailers were classified
and those with a bad record of cutting prices on Beechnut products were
denied the further right to purchase such products. In 1922, the company was
advised that its efforts constituted unfair competition.51 The Court pointed out
43. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 11 F. 2d
337, 340 (6th Cir. 1926).
44. 250 U. S. 300, 39 Sup. Ct. 465, 63 L. Ed. 992 (1919).
45. If done with intent to create a monopoly, refusal to sell is unlawful. United
States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, 63 F. Supp. 32 (D. Minn. 1945).
46. This seems to have been established as law before the Colgate case. See Brown,
The Right to Reftse to Sell, 25 YALE L. J. 194 (1916) ; Slichter, The Cream of Wheat
Case, 31 POL. Sci. Q. 392 (1916).
47. Sayre, Maintenance of Resale Prices, 6 ORE. L. REv. 241, 243 (1927).
48. A boycott requires concerted action and is prima. facie unlawful. Fashion
Originators Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F. 2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940).
49. See Note, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L. 3.
1121 (1949).
50. United States v. Hudnut, 8 F. 2d 1010 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), 35 YALE L. J.
1017 (1926).
51. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup.
Ct. 150, 66 -L. Ed.. 307 (1922). Counsel for Beechnut reviewed the background of this
case and its implications in Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance, 32 YALE L. J. 676 (1923).
1949 ]
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that the company's practices went beyond a mere refusal to sell, for the
"system here disclosed necessarily constitutes a scheme which restrains the
natural flow of commerce and the freedom of competition in the channels of
interstate trade ... ." 52 The Court found that it could "infer, indeed cannot
escape the conclusion, that competition among retail distributors is practically
suppressed." 53 Once again justice Holmes dissented and this time was joined
by Justice Brandeis who had been appointed to the Court in 1916.54 The dissent
saw nothing wrong in making a condition of sale to a retailer that the retailer
accept whatever terms of resale that the manufacturer might set.
Not only could a company not take measures to assure itself that its pro-
ducts were being sold at the suggested resale prices, but it could not even solicit
information from its customers as to resale price maintenance by these cus-
tomers or other customers.55 The producers, further, could not require the
assurance of the retailers that resale prices would be maintained.56 Thus all
effective measures of control over prices subsequent to sale were outlawed be-
cause the Court in the Dr. Miles case had refused to apply the test of the rule
of reason to the entire field of resale price maintenance. 4
In 1926, however, the Court did approve of one form of resale price main-
tenance. In United States v. General Electric Co.,5 7 it was held that if a true
agency relation existed, the principal could fix the prices at which the agent
might sell at retail. The proposition was clear. It was also certain that the
establishment of an agent in every retail outlet was a burden that could only
be assumed by an industrial giant. It was like "an Achilles' bow. The small
man cannot bend it." 58 What was deemed worse was the establishment by an
able student of the thesis that: "The difference between the Dr. Miles market-
ing scheme and the General Electric marketing scheme is in no important
practical aspect more than verbal." 59 This student also confirmed the belief
that the General Electric case gave only the larger and wealthier firms the
right to control resale prices. But, he pointed out, even General Electric would
have preferred the simpler and easier way and was in 1928 "one of the largest
contributors of funds to the American Fair Trade League," 60 which for so
See also Note, The Attitude of the Federal Courts Toward Resale Price Maintenance
since the Beechnut Decision, 27 COL. L. REv. 183 (1927).
52. 257 U. S. at 454.
53. Id. at 455.
54. Justice McKenna also concurred in this dissent. 257 U. S. at 457. Justice
McReynolds dissented separately.
55. Cream of Wheat Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 14 F. 2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926).
56. Toledo Pipe-Threading Mach. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 11 F. 2d
337 (6th Cir. 1926).
57. 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926). See Note, Effect of
Sherman Act on Fixing Prices of Patented Goods By Agency Licensing Agreements,
51 YALE L. J. 299 (1941).
58. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 11,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1926) (Hereinafter cited as "Hearings on H. R. 11 (1926).")
59. Klaus, Sale, Agency, and Price .ilaitenance, 28 COL. L. REv. 312, 315; 441 (1928).
60. Id. at 463-64.
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many years had been lobbying in Congress for resale price maintenance laws.
This survey of the status of resale price maintenance in the federal courts
is sufficient to show that only an act of Congress could make it permissible
when applied to goods passing in interstate commerce. Because of the General
Electric case, several writers have commented that the federal courts made the
legality of maintaining resale prices depend upon the method used,6' holding
written contracts to achieve this .end invalid but upholding the practice when
the marketing method used was one of agency. It seems inconceivable that a
principal would ever be denied the right to fix the price at which his agent
might sell the'principal's product. But practically, as indicated above, the
agency method of marketing is not desirable for a number of reasons, of which
it is sufficient to mention anti-chain store legislation, social security and other
tax burdens, and liability for the torts of an agent. Thus until the Miller-Tyd-
ings Act was passed, resale price maintenance for goods in interstate commerce
was not generally possible.
An account will now be had of the more limited but no less competitive
field of intrastate commerce. Prior to 1933, the legislative and judicial records
of state attempts at resale price maintenance were few and their importance as
precedents was therefore magnified. As early as 1885, Missouri had approved
of a contract to maintain resale prices.62 It should be noted, however, that
when such contracts were upheld, a statute containing a nonsigner clause was
not being upheld. The early state cases recognized that a restraint of trade
was present in the factual situation, but they were distinguished from the Dr.
Miles case by the finding of the state courts that only a part of the available
supply of ground chocolate 63 or trademarked flour 64 was being subjected to
these contracts and that therefore no tendency towards a monopoly was to be
expected. This tendency towards a monopoly being the test for an unreasonable
restraint of trade, the court approved of these particular contracts. In the
flour case, the Washington court expressly stated that these contracts would
not bind anyone except the parties to the contracts. 6 5 But in the chocolate
case, for one of the few recorded instances, the California court justified bind-
ing a purchaser from one of the parties to the resale price agreed upon in the
contract, and further, did so as a matter of contract law. As will be seen, the
statutory nonsigner clauses were later validated as a proper exercise of the
state police power. In this latter case, the commodities idf question, bottles of
ground chocolate, had notices attached declaring that an express condition
for the resale of these bottles was that the fixed resale' price be maintained.
61. 35 YALE L. 3. 1017 (1926); 41 MIcH L. REV. 747 (1943). See also BURNS,THE
DEcLINE OF Co-mPiwrTIoN 430 (1936).
62. Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885).
63. Ghirardelli v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355, 128 Pac. 1041 (1912).
64. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144, 51 L. R. A.
(.. s.) 522 (1913).
65. Id. at 668, 137 Pac. at 151.
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The original contract was between manufacturer and wholesaler. The court
said that when a retailer bought from the wholesaler with knowledge of the
attached notice, an implied contract was created and that the manufacturer
was a third party beneficiary who could sue to enforce this second contract.
This is a novel view of the concept of third party beneficiary 66 and seems
doubtful as an authority. This rationale does not appear to have been tested
in subsequent cases.
The same issues arose in Massachusetts under different circumstances.
First of all, it was decided that if A and B contracted to maintain prices and
B sold to C, A had no power to control the resale price set by C.67 But if B has
C buy from A and sell what he buys to B so that B may resell what he got
from C unrestricted by the resale price limits set under his own contract with
A, the court will permit A to sue B to force him to observe the prices set under
the original A-B contract. 68 The basis of the enforcement in this latter instance
was B's fraud.
JUDICIAL RECEPTION OF THE LEGISLATION
The first state statute which made resale price maintenance possible was
passed in 1913 in New Jersey.69 The statute did not expressly legalize price
maintenance contracts but instead forbade discrimination against the owner
of a trademark by depreciating its value in the public mind. Since, as will be
seen, the standard argument is that price cutting destroys the property value
of a trademark by causing depreciation of its value in the public mind, this
statute was broad enough to support efforts at resale price maintenance.. In
Ingersoll v. Hahne & Co.,70 the New Jersey court declared that contracts de-
signed to prevent price cutting of standard articles, well known to the public,
not the subject of monopoly and not necessaries of life, were not opposed to
public policy. The main authority for this holding was the dissent of Justice
Holmes in the Dr. Miles case.
In 1931, California started the final step in the development of the Fair
Trade -movement. A statute passed that year permitted contracts between
manufacturers and retailers which stipulated the resale price.71 As a leading
student of the question states it: "This act aroused no great interest... because
it added nothing to the existing law under judicial interpretation in the state.
But in 1933 the California legislature added a brief amendment which incited
renewed activity, interest, and enthusiasm; so much so that the movement
quickly swept the states piecemeal and forced an amendment to the federal
66. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRAcTS, § 133 (1933).
67. Garst v. Hall & Lyon Co., 179 Mass. 588, 61 N. E. 219 (1901).
68. Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N. E. 839 (1905).
69. N. J. Laws 1913, c. 210. The text of the statute is reprinted in Rogers, Predatory
Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L. REv. 139, 154-55 n. 25 (1913).
70. 88 N. J. Eq. 222, 101 Atl. 1030 (Ch. 1917).
71. Cal. Stats. 1931, c. 278.
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law in August 1937, over the objections of the President." 72 The cause of
all this disturbance was the" addition to the California Fair Trade Act of the
nonsigner clause, 73 which, as seen above, was included almost verbatim in the
44 subsequent Fair Trade acts. The validity of this provision had to be assured
before the Fair Trade program was certain of success. California courts up-
held the statute, including the nonsigner clause.74 About the same time, how-
ever, the New York Court of Appeals declared the Fair Trade Act of that
state unconstitutional.7 5
The New York Court objected to this law on the ground that it was an
arbitrary price-fixing statute. Nebbia v. New York 76 had established the
principle that there was no closed category of businesses affected with the
public interest which alone were subject to state price regulation. But that
case, the Court of Appeals held, had not suggested that the field was now clear
for a general price-fixing law without a reasonable necessity being demon-
strated, and such necessity had not been shown in the instant case. Further,
the New York court continued, if the power to fix these prices does exist, it
cannot be delegated, as attempted under this statute, to private parties whose
agreement will bind other purchasers who had not contracted. 77
This direct clash was soon resolved. The Supreme Court, without quali-
fications, unanimously upheld the Fair Trade Act of Illinois in Old Dearborn
Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp.73 The facts in that case raised
the issue squarely. A nonsigner had failed to maintain the resale prices set
in contracts between the company and other retailers and a petition for an
injunction was presented. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the Court, de-
clared that these statutes, which applied only to trademarked goods, embodied
a reasonable classification of commodities. The trademark is an identifying
brand which in the course of trade has attached to it a goodwill which is a
valuable property right. The states are well within a reasonable exercise of
their police power when they act to protect this property right. The legitimizing
of these contracts to restrict prices is an appropriate means to this end. Such
contracts are not to be considered as legislative price-fixing because they are
permissive and a producer always bad the right to fix the price of his products.
72. GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 18 (1939).
73. Cal. Stats. 1933, c. 260.
74. Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936); Pyroil
Sales Co. v. The Pep Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 784, 55 P. 2d 194, 1186 (1936).
75. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. R. H. Macy, 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409, 103
A. L. R. 1325 (1936).
76. 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
77. This case was criticized in 22 VA. L. Rzv. 556 (1936) on the ground that price-
fixing is beyond the state police power only when arbitrary and, further, that a study
of the facts would have shown that this exercise of the police power was not unreason-
able.
78. 299 U. S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct.. 139, 81 L. Ed. 109 (1936). On the authority of this
case the California statute was upheld on the same day. The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales
Co., 299 U. S. 198, 57 Sup. Ct. 147, 81 L. Ed. 122 (1936).
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In the light of the discussion which follows in this article, it is well to emphasize
that Justice Sutherland firmly expressed the opinion that the sole purpose of
this state statute was to afford a legitimate remedy for an injury to the good-
will of the manufacturer which resulted from the price-cutting of trade-
marked goods. It may be suggested that the facts of commercial life were not
considered here either.
With the handing down of the Old Dearborn opinion, state judicial ob-
jection to the Fair Trade acts collapsed.79 The New York statute was tested
again and, on the basis of the Supreme Court decision, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself.80 The other states fell into line 81 with only rearguard actions
being fought by a few dissenting judges.82
Florida deserves some special mention. Twice now, the Florida Supreme
Court has invalidated the Fair Trade Act of that state. Both times, the rejec-
tion of the statute was on relatively narrow and technical grounds and on both
occasions the state legislature promptly re-enacted the statute with minor
modifications. In the first case,83 the action was against a nonsigner. The
action was dismissed because the title of the Act "restricts the subject of the
Act and implies that its provisions will be applicable only to retailers who
voluntarily enter into such contracts, and not to retailers who refrain from
doing so." 84 The second case,85 which overturned the statute last spring, re-
vealed a severe struggle within the court. The points upon which the case
seems to have turned were that this was admittedly a price-fixing statute,
that a state price-fixing statute required a showing within the statute of public
necessity, that there was no such declaration in this statute, and therefore the
act could not be permitted to stand as a general law.86 The Florida legislature
79. The various state constitutional and legal problems connected with these
statutes are considered in Note, Resale Price Maintenance Statutes, 45 YALE L. J. 672
(1936) ; Legis., The Fair Trade Laws: State Validation of Resale Price Maintenance,
36 COL. L. REv. 293 (1936); Note, Prices: Resale Price Control Under State Fair
Trade Acts, 28 CAi. L. REv. 477 (1940).
80. Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30, 110 A. L. R.
1411 (1937). The New York Fair Trade Act is discussed in Martin, The Fair Trade
Act, 5 FORD. L. REv. 50 (1936). The New York Fair Trade Act is indexed in the New
York code under "Price Fixing." Index M-Z (McKinney, 1941).
81. The usual reason for upholding the state statutes was the authority of the Old
Dearborn case. Among other cases see Weco Products Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis.
474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Owl Drug Co., 67 S. D. 523,
295 N. W. 292 (1940). An elaborate and ornate opinion upheld the North Carolina act
upon a basis of "parallelism of precedent" and "a degree of perpendicular thinking."
Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 170, 4 S. E. 2d 528, 533, 125 A. L. R.
1308 (1939).
82. An obvious but seldom heard objection to these acts was stated in a dissenting
opinion in Sears v. Western Thrift Stores, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 389, 116 P. 2d 756,
764 (1941). This dissenting judge said: "The Fair Trade Practices Act of this state
thus confers upon the manufacturer the right by operation of law to force all retailers
to conform to a contract made with one retailer."
83. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939).
84. Id. at 511, 188 So. at 92.
85. Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
86. One statement in the majority opinion was: "A state may not prohibit and make
punishable those who enter into agreements in restraint of trade or which tend to
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quickly passed a statute embodying what was deemed to be the requisite declara-
tion of public necessity.8 7
This survey of the legal foundation of the state Fair Trade movement in-
dicates that so far as the constitutionality of these state statutes is concerned,
the problem is now settled. Space limitations prevent any consideration of the
many legal problems that have arisen under these laws. What is of more sig-
nificance is that if no aid can be expected from the courts, any opponent of
these acts must devote his attention to the wisdom of the legislatures in passing
the acts. It is to this problem that this study will now turn. At the beginning
of this Fair Trade movement, there were men who advanced arguments in
which they sincerely believed and which they felt showed irrefutably the
necessity for protecting the manufacturers by the method of resale price
maintenance. Louis D. Brandeis was the most eminent member of this group.
There is ample reason to doubt this sincerity today and this doubt is a major
factor in questioning the whole Fair Trade program. Furthermore, sufficient
evidence exists to rebut the formal arguments of the proponents of this legislar
tion. This formal presentation of the case for resale price maintenance will
now be examined in conjunction with a commentary upon the history of the
movement to persuade Congress to enact national legislation. When the case
for the legislation is fairly before us, an analysis will then be made of the
adequacy of that case in the light of available evidence. Whatever one may
think of the result of this analysis, the defense of the Fair Trade movement
in action will be a more difficult task. This difficulty will be demonstrated by.
an examination of pressure groups operating upon our economy which have
used a conceptual lag to disguise a veritable tumor. It will be shown that what
was once a sincere defense of a property right by the property-right owner has
become the pretext for the bludgeoning of one economic group for the benefit
of another.
THE CASE FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The premises upon which the debate over resale price maintenance has
been based appeared on the scene fully grown. The finest mind ever to support
the movement was the first speaker to gain a national hearing and nobody has
materially improved upon his arguments since they were first given. Some-
time in 1913, Louis D. Brandeis came to the conclusion thatthe manufacturers
of trademarked goods needed some power of protection against retailers who
used these nationally known brands to attract customers into their stores by
restrict competition and then grant immunity to a class consisting of those who enter
into vertical contracts and agreements having the same obnoxious impact upon the
public interest. It is the effect of the contract or agreement that is to be considered."
40 So. 2d. at 385.
87. The text of this new statute is in 2 CCH TRADE. REG. SERV. ff 8164 (1949).
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sharply cutting the prices on goods bearing such brands. In November of 1913,
Brandeis had published in Harper's Weekly 88 an article that was to be re-
printed time and again by the advocates of these laws.8 9
Brandeis' mature life had spanned the period in our history in which the
great trusts and combinations had come to power and he had seen that power
curbed by the imposition of a small measure of control. Suspicious of bigness
in business, Brandeis thought that he saw in some common retailing practices
the elements of a growth, which, if unchecked, would create a retailing monop-
oly. This trend, he thought, had been aided by judicial legislation in the Dr.
Miles and other cases which had blocked the exercise of a basic power of the
manufacturer to protect his goodwill. If the manufacturer could not protect
his goodwill, the many small and independent retailers could not protect it for
him.
It was Brandeis' contention, in his now famous article, that a contract to
maintain resale prices on trademarked goods was not an unreasonable restraint
of trade. The manufacturer using a trademark has a property interest in that
mark which needs protection. This property interest was the goodwill that
went with a nationally known brand for which the producer had, by national
advertising, built up a large consumer demand. This goodwill, he asserted, is
destroyed by price cutting. A well-known trademarked brand that everybody
knows and wants will be used as low-priced "bait" to entice customers into
the store. Brandeis maintained that this use of another's property as a "mis-
leader" was dishonest. He said that "ordinarily the 'very purpose of the cut-
price is to create a false impression," 90 meaning by this that the deluded patron
of such a store was led to believe that all the prices in this store were equally
low. When prices are cut for this purpose, the cut-rate store makes its profit
by abnormally high price margins on its other goods. The other retailers
can meet this competition by also selling the same brands at a loss, but they
are more apt just to stop selling them at all or, at least, not make any selling
effort to move such products. The net result is that cut prices hurt everyone
and the conclusion Brandeis draws is that when such a situation is created,
"it is better policy for the regular dealer to drop the line altogether." 91
To permit the producer to protect his branded merchandise by means of at-
taching price conditions for resale will not tend to create a monopoly, Brandeis
claimed, because the individual producer would fix unreasonable prices at his
88. Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices-The Competition That Kills, HARPER'S WEEKLY
10 (Nov. 15, 1913).
89. Reprinted in Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coininerce
on H. R. 13305, 63rd Cong., 2d & 3d Sess. 67 (1915) (Hereinafter cited as "Hearings on
H. R. 13305 (1915)"); Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coln-
-nerce on H. R. 13568, Part 2, 243 (1916) (Hereinafter cited as "Hearings on H. R,
13568, Part 2 (1916)") ; Hearings on H. R. 11, 126 (1926).




peril, if his products were in competition. But the unrestricted cutting of re-
sale prices was making the lot of the independent retailer worse. These in-
dependents were being pushed to the point where they would have to combine
themselves or be destroyed by the monopolistic giants in the distribution field.
He said that the process of exterminating the small independent retailer al-
ready hard pressed by capitalistic combinations, such as mail order houses and
chain stores, was accelerating. And finally, Brandeis posed his point as a grand
climax: "Shall we, under the guise of protecting competition, further foster
monopoly by creating immunity for the price-cutters ?" 92
This article was only three pages long and could not elaborate upon all
the issues raised in it. But writers contemporary with its publication developed
some of the ideas there presented. 93 For instance, if price cutting was unfair
and dishonest, the practices should be tortious conduct. This argument was
developed, in a somewhat oversimplified fashion, in the Harvard Law Review
by one who was to be an able and aggressive proponent of this legislation for
decades. 94 It was the contention of this writer that if price cutting is to be
classified as unfair competition, and therefore tortious, it should be based not
upon deception of the public, as in trademark infringement cases, but upon the
damage to the goodwill of the trademark owner and the test should be: Is
business or goodwill being diverted from one who has created it, to his injury
and to the benefit of the parasite? 95 The extent to which this suggestion was
embodied in the law will be indicated later.
One loose end appears evident in these arguments. If the same article is
being sold for different prices, is the seller at the lower price a price cutter?
Is there any difference in prices possible that fills short of "predatory price
cutting?" 96 In short, is there no place for price competition among retaile-s?
Fantastic as it may seem, to this day the proponents of resale price maintenance
insist that there is no place for competition over prices in the field of retail
distribution.97 Again in 1913, this point was made, and with some authority,
92. Id. at 12.
93. See Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices, 63 U. OF PA. L. REv.
22 (1914).
94. Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L. REv. 139 (1913).
See also ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 277 et seq. (1914).
95. Rogers, supra note 94, at 150.
96. Twenty-five years later the question was raised as to where the distinction
was between "good" price cutting based upon business efficiencies and "bad" price
cutting which was unfair competition. This remained an unresolved and fundamental
question throughout all of this period. McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts, 86 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 803, 812 (1938).
97. A distinguished writer recently asserted that the restraints imposed by resale
price maintenance are not those contemplated by the antitrust acts. Resale price main-
tenance is supposedly just another method of merchandising. The retailer no longer
sells his goods. Trademarks and national advertising do this work for him. The elimina-
tion of the retailer would have no effect upon prices which are created by the com-
petition between producers of rival products. Callmann, "Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust
Law, 10 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 443, 458 (1949). Even assuming that the part played by
national advertising in creating consumer demand is as great as is here claimed, it
does not follow that no resale price differences should result. As always, the best proof
1949 1]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
since the following quotation is from an opinion of the Supreme Court of
Washington:
"It seems to us an economic fallacy to assume that the competition which, in the
absence of monopoly, benefits the public, is competition between rival retailers. The true
competition is between rival articles, a competition in excellence, which can never be
maintained if, through the perfidy of the retailer who cuts prices for his own ulterior
purposes, the manufacturer is forced to compete in prices with goods of his own pro-
duction, while the retailer recoups his losses on the cut price by the sale of other articles
at, or above, their reasonable price. It is a fallacy to assume that the price cutter pockets
the loss. The public makes it up on other purchases. The manufacturer alone is injured,
except as the public is also injured through the manufacturer's inability, in the face of
cut prices, to maintain the excellence of his product. 8 . . . It will not do to say that the
manufacturer has no interest to protect by contract in the goods after he has sold them.
They are personally identified and morally guaranteed by his mark and his advertise-
ment." 99
Three months after the publication of Brandeis' article, the Stevens bill
was introduced into Congress. This was the first attempt to legalize in inter-
state commerce contracts to maintain resale prices. 100 Under this bill the prices
were to be stated upon the article and also filed with the Bureau of Corpora-
tions. In the House hearings that began shortly thereafter, Brandeis was the
first and principal witness. Brandeis had previously been consulted by the
American Fair Trade League under whose auspices the bill had been drafted.1 1
At the time of this hearing,10 2 resale price maintenance was still understood to
be designed to protect primarily the manufacturer, but Brandeis inserted in the
record the names of scores of retail associations who favored the bill. At
these hearings, Brandeis added little more to the basic arguments except that
he felt that nothing should be done about making sure that reasonable prices
were set in these contracts. He asserted that competition would guarantee
reasonable contract prices, meaning, of course, competition among the manu-
facturers only. 1 3 This belief has survived to the present time and only Wis-
consin among all the states that have passed Fair Trade laws has made any
provision for handling complaints that the prices set in resale price maintenance
contracts are unreasonable.10 4
of this is the opposition of the department stores and the mail order houses to resale
price maintenance.
98. Hence the slogan: "Demoralize the price and you demoralize the product."
Hearings oil H. R. 13305, 159 (1915).
99. Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 668-69, 137 Pac. 144, 151,
51 L. R. A. (w. s.) 522 (1913).
100. FTC REPORT 39-40 (1945).
101. William H. Ingersoll, one of the organizers of the Fair Trade League, was
closely examined as to his knowledge of Brandeis' association with the League. Appar-
ently Brandeis got no fee for his work on behalf of resale price maintenance. Hear-
oings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on the
Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Associate Jnstice of the Supreme Court,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 976 et seq. (1916). Brandeis' biographer claims that Brandeis was
the author of the Stevens bill. MAsoN, BRANDEIS, A FREE MAx's LIFE 502 (1946).
102. Hearings on H. R. 13305, 65 (1915).
103. Id. at 63.
104. Wis. STAT. § 133.25(7) (1945).
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Brandeis did contribute at this hearing the statement of a seductive prop-
osition: "The American principle is that a man has a right to do anything
he pleases with the article he buys unless he has an agreement with the man
from whom he bought it that he shall do something else." 105 The reasonable-
ness of this view hides its doubtful universality.
As in- every subsequent hearing, the members of the committee tried to
pin one of the witnesses down about these "loss leaders" that were deluding
the public. Both extremes on this issue were stated at this time. The witness
representing the National Association of Retail Druggists asked for the pas-
sage of the bill to protect "the ignorant and careless purchasers, who in reality
constitute a large portion of the consuming public." 106 A man, renowned for
half a century for his common sense, Congressman Alben Barkley of Ken-
tucky, replied to this that, "I think if I get fooled that is my own misfortune,
and I do not think the Congress of the United States will ever pass a law that
will put intelligence in the people and keep them from being gulled by some-
body who is slick enough to gull them." 107
The Stevens bill failed to pass, but 1914 did see the passage of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, section 5(a) of which has particular significance in
this narrative. This section declared: "Unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, are hereby declared unlawful." 108 What this meant was, of course, to
be determined by the courts. It was not to be an easy task. 09 In the field of
105. Hearings on H. R. 13305, 63 (1915).
106. Id. at 112. A counterpart of this attitude was that of the manufacturer who,
selling throughout the country at one price, fixed by Fair Trade contract different
resale prices in different states. The company decided what price margin was proper
under the existing local competitive conditions. The president of the company said that
this was done because "you have a group of unintelligent retailers and you have to do
something to protect them from themselves." Hearings before Temporary National
Economic Committee, Part 6, 2558 (1939) (Hereinafter cited as "TNEC Hearings
(1939)").
107. Id. at 99. The only discovered discussion on the enforcement of these contracts
made before a Congressional committee was had in this first hearing and the question
was raised by Congressman Barkley. He asked (p. 31): "Does this bill undertake to
punish a man who violates that agreement?" Brandeis answered: "No; I say it does
not undertake to punish him; but undertakes to give the maker or producer the right
to make a contract establishing a standard price, and if such a contract is valid the
ordinary means of enforcing it will exist." It is doubtful that Brandeis had in mind
any device like a nonsigner clause, and the ordinary law of contracts would not give
any right against a nonsigner. The failure ever to consider the effect of the nonsigner
clause in the state laws apparently led the Senate to misjudge the effect of what it
was doing in the Miller-Tydings Act. The Committee reported to the Senate, that
passage of the Act would "not commit the Congress to a national policy on the subject
matter of the State laws." SEx. REP. No. 879, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937).
108. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 44 (1941).
109. See Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition, 29 YALE L." J. 1 (1919).
An introductory historical note is in Jones, Historical Development of the Lazo of Busi-
ness Competition, 35 YALE L. J. 905 (1926) ; 36 id. 42, 207, 351 (1926-27). For unfair
competition as a common law crime see Herbruck, Forestalling, Regrating and Engross-
ing, 27 MicH. L. REV. 365 (1929). The effect of these common law crimes was to deny
recognition to the middle man which is an approach continued by resale price main-
tenance. For information on engrossing laws in the United States, see McAllister, Price




pricing laws, however, the issue was pointed to whether or not predatory
price cutting was to be included within the scope of unfair competition. The
efforts in-this direction and the result will be considered later in this article.
In 1915, the Stephens bill was introduced in Congress to authorize the
prescribing of uniform prices and manners of settlement at which the different
qualities and quantities of each article covered by a contract might be resold.
A hearing was held but no action was taken. 1 0
Three years later, the Federal Trade Commission sent a special report to
Congress 111 on resale price maintenance, pointing out that since its inception
the Commission had been dealing with cases involving the validity of the resale
price contracts. The dilemma that faced the Commission seemed worthy of Con-
gressional consideration. The Supreme Court had outlawed these contracts
as restraints of trade and yet the manufacturer seemed entitled to some pro-
tection when the cutting of the retail prices of his trademarked products was
indulged in by others for unfair trade purposes. The Commission acknowl-
edged that the right of the manufacturer to fix the resale prices of his products
should not be permitted without some safeguard for the public interest. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission proposed for Congressional consideration a law
which would'read that "if the manufacturer of an article produced and sold
under competitive conditions desires to fix and maintain resale prices, he shall
file with an agency designated by Congress a description of such article, the
contract of sale, and the price schedule which he proposes to maintain, and
that the agency designated by the Congress be charged with the duty, either
upon its own initiative or upon the complaint of any dealer or consumer ...
to review the terms of such contract and to revise such prices .... ,, 112
No action was taken on this proposal and nothing like it was ever suggested
again by the Commission. Meanwhile, in each term of Congress' until 1933,
what became known as the Capper-Kelly bill was introduced with the same
negative results." 3 The hearing on this bill held in 1926 brought forth some
refinements in the theory of resale price maintenance. When the inquiry was
centered on the different costs of operation among various types of retailers,
the question was asked how a uniform price could be fixed to avoid either
exorbitant profits for some or destruction for others. The answer to this was
given with some assurance since the witness was certain that the question re-
lated to a theoretical situation only. The reply was that "The price-cutter is the
high-rent man. He does not cut prices on branded goods as a means of lowering
prices to the public or passing on any economies. Quite the opposite. He cuts
branded-goods prices as a means of gouging the public. He has high costs and
110. See Hearings before Connittec on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R.
13568, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
111. H. R. Doc. No. 1480, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918).
112. Id. at 2.
113. FTC REPORT 41, 43 (1945).
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high rents to pay and he wants to conceal them from the public." 114 These
practices are typical of the metropolitan department stores. Statistics were
available, this witness claimed, to show that the large chains were also high
cost retailers. Nevertheless, they have created an impression with the public,
by extensive advertising of national brands as loss leaders, that they are eco-
nomical sources for household purchases. 115 This price differential point con-
tinued to be pressed and another example was proposed. Suppose A insisted
that the price set by a manufacturer was too high and that he, A, would be
satisfied with a smaller profit. What should be done about A ?" The answer
was logical. A probably didn't exist but if he did, treatment should be accorded
him with the goal in mind of the greatest good of the greatest number. "I-would
say we had better let him put that additional profit in his pocket and make
him keep it than by cutthroat competition permit him to put out of business a
lot of other folks whose injury will be much greater than the slight good he
can do the consumer on a few cases of Colgate's soap." 116 It is clear from
this that the "greatest number" was limited to members of the class of retailers.
The elements of a contradictory argument first appeared in this hearing.
One witness maintained that low cost stores under the proposed bill need not
raise their prices on trademarked products because they are perfectly free to
deal in unbranded goods. 1 7 Contrasted with this is the contention that the
consumer demand for these goods is created by national advertising This
means that such goods must be carried in stock to sustain the store's reputation
as a retail outlet 118 and, further, that the price must be met that is set by any
competitor or again the store's reputation suffersby gaining the name of being
high-priced. This latter situation was supposed to have created the urgency
for this legislation. The small retailers could not afford to sell the products
that they could not afford not to carry in stock. The reality of this dilemma
will be examined later. It may be suggested that the answer will be to query
why the retailer cannot lower his price.
This ultimate issue after these views must be the place of competition
under this program. The proponents of this bill answered this flatly by claim-
ing that the only place for competition was in the setting of the price which
will be made uniform among retailers by this bill."1 9 To assure this competition,
114. Hearings on H. R. 11, 29-30 (1926). The Federal Trade Commission, on the
basis of admittedly unsatisfactory data, found the average breakeven point for inde-
pendent retailers to be a 34% markup. An average markup of 33% among 50 department
stores gave an average return of 12% net profit on investment. FTC REPoRT, Part II,
94 (1931).
115. Id. at 42 et seq.,
116. Id. at 202.
117. Id. at 14. This argument was used by Justice Sutherland in the Old Dearborn
case when he found nothing wrong in binding a retailer to a contract made by another.
Such a retailer was not bound to use such trademarked goods:.,299 U. S. 183, 193-94,
57 Sup. Ct, 139, 81 L. Ed. 109 (1936).
118. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 111 (1937).
119. Id. at 69.
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the good name of the manufacturers must be protected. 20 One of the Congress-
men then pointed out that the value of this brand name was created by national
advertising and might or might not actually be a mark of quality and yet this
doubtful attribute was to be the sole point of competition because this bill
would cut off all other competition among the dealers. At this there was no
hesitation: the reply was that the retail level was no place for competition
because experience had proved that competition, spread among so many hun-
dreds of thousands of dealers, becomes an irresponsible competition which
breeds unfair practices and really interferes with the productive function and
raises costs there. 121 All competition among retailers produces what the sponsor
of this bill, Congressman Kelly, called "malignant price warfare." 122
At the time these arguments were being made, there had been little actual
experience with resale price maintenance laws. As pointed out above, the
first of the Fair Trade acts was passed in California in 1931. Federal legislation
lay years ahead, but there was a practice run of a few years undfer the N. R. A.
codes. When examination is made of the codes, the most noticeable fact is that
resale price maintenance clauses appear, not in the codes prepared by the
manufacturers, but in the retail codes. A new class is now pushing this
legislation. It had been noticed in the 1926 hearings that the manufacturers
were no longer interested very strongly in this movement, but no inferences
were drawn from this observation. 123 The entry upon the scene of the retailers
as the proponents of this legislation should have changed the nature of the
arguments in support of the program. But it did not. As pointed out pre-
viously, Justice Sutherland upheld the Illinois Fair Trade Act in 1936 be-
cause it was a reasonable method of protecting the manufacturers' property
rights in their trademarks.124
The loss-limitation provision in the Retail Drug Code 125 showed the
haste in which it was written. The provision stated that the use of the "so-
called 'loss leader' is hereby declared to be an unfair trade practice. These
'loss leaders' are articles often sold below cost to [sic] the merchant for the
purpose of attracting trade." 126 It was expressly stated that this was not a
prohibition against selling without profit to the seller, but the selling price must
include labor costs. In his letter of transmittal of this code to the President,
Gen. Hugh Johnson, the N. R. A. Administrator, mentioned the pressure for
inclusion of this provision as a protection against predatory price cutting.127
120. So valuable was this good name "that we could well have afforded to let the
factory burn down rather than have our name ruined." Id. at 70.
121. Id. at 73.
122. Congressman Kelly's statement on the bill opened the hearings. Id. at 3 ct seq.
123. Id. at 51.
124. See note 78 supra.
125. 2 N. R. A. CODES OF FAIR Coan'aTnioz 27 (1934).
126. Id. at 36.
127. Id. at 29. An identical provision was included in the Code of the Retail Food
and Grocery Trade, 4 N. R. A. CODES OF FAIR CONPETITIo 457 (1934). This gives
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The N. R. A. experience only whetted the appetites of those who wanted
this kind of price restriction and the drive in the Thirties for Fair Trade laws
became irresistible. Thirteen states had such laws by 1936 and 28 others fol-
lowed in 1937.128 The carefully organized campaign to secure the passage of
these laws was then directed against Congress and in August of 1937 the Miller-
Tydings Act was signed by the President.129 The Act declared that contracts
fixing minimum resale prices made in accordance with the laws of the various
states were not a violation of the Sherman Act nor were they an unfair trade
practice under section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Act
had an unfortunate legislative history that aroused more objection than the
provisions of the Act itself. 130 President Roosevelt was dissatisfied, first, with
Congressional consideration of the bills, then, with the passage of the Act, and,
finally, with the manner of its passage. In April, the President had written to
Congress that he was requesting a recommendation on this legislation from the
Federal Trade Commission, but at the time of his writing he felt that it was
"untimely" to attempt "to legalize any competitive or marketing practice cal-
culated to facilitate increases in the costs of numerous and important articles
which American householders ... buy." 131 He asked the Congress to forego
consideration of the bill and to authorize the Federal Trade Commission to
make further studies of the problem. Finally when the bill was passed, the
President voiced his disapproval of the use of a rider to an appropriation bill
in passing this type of law and he expressed the hope that this law "would
not boost prices as much as some of his advisers feared it would." 132
The debate in Congress on the Act was unproductive. The proponents of
the bill denied that it was a price-fixing law and declared that the main purpose
of the bill was to back up the states which had passed such laws.133 But'the re-
ports on the bills show signs of the contradiction that was developing between
practice and theory in the Fair Trade movement. Congressman Celler of New
York wrote a separate report to say that while he would vote for the bill
a good idea of the intensity of the pressure since the policy recommendations of the
N. R. A. had been opposed to resale price maintenance becoming a part of any code.
The basis for the opposition was that the existing law, through permitting a refusal
to sell to a price cutting retailer, gave adequate protection to the manufacturer. LYON
ET AL., THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADmINISTRATION 729-30 (1935).
128. FTC REPORT 69 (1945).
129. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1941).
130. See the minority report of Senator King of Utah in SEN. REP. No. 879, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). The bill was attached as a rider to the District of Columbia
appropriation bill. A veto of the bill thus- became impossible without a veto of the
appropriation and Congress had already adjourned.
131. 81 CONG. REc. 3838 (1937).
132. N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1937, p. 26, col. 1.
133. H. R. REP. No. 382, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); SEN. REP. No. 879, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). Trouble in semantics developed during the debate. Senator
Tydings wound up a speech in support of the bill by declaring that he had never
voted for a price-fixing bill in his life. The next speaker, Senator Austin of Vermont,
then showed how full choice still remained in the states. For instance, he suggested,
look at the people of Vermont who had said: "We do not want price fixing in this
State." 81 CoNG. REc. 7496 (1937).
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there were a few unresolved questions in his mind. He wanted to know why
there were no manufacturers at the hearings on this bill. He seemed fairly
certain that this indicated the pressure-group nature of this legislation. He then
queried whether this ganging up of retailers would not now be used to raise
prices. 134 The Senate committee, apparently unaware of any such develop-
ments, reported that the state laws here being supported were directed against
the "so-called loss-leader selling" which "operates as a fraud on the consumer,
destroys the producer's goodwill in his trademark, and is used by the large
rmerchant to eliminate his small independent competitor." 135 The views of
justice Sutherland in the Old Dearborn case are clearly reflected here
with no intimation that such views were now obsolescent. The hearings preced-
ing the passage of this law contributed little to the previously examined argu-
ments in support of the general theory of resale price maintenance. 3 6
This brings the legislative history of resale price maintenance to a momen-
tary halt. The next effort will center upon repealing the Miller-Tydings Act.137
The wisdom of such action, of course, should be the determinative factor.
Having now reviewed the development of the Fair Trade movement and having
considered in some detail the nature of the theoretical support for this legis-
lation, this study will turn to an investigation of the materials at hand to serve
in rebuttal of this support. A study of the forces used to put the Fair Trade
movement into practice will then be used as a setting for an appraisal of the
position of this movement in our competitive economy.
REBUTTAL OF THE FORMAL CASE FOR RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The previous statement of the arguments of the advocates of maintaining
retail prices was stated with perhaps some laboring of the premises. But if the
statement in its fullness was fairly presented, an examination may be made
with confidence that this was the whole case. If it is, then it seems obvious that
the first question is: What is a "loss leader?" It is certainly some form of
price cutting. This leads to the second question: To what extent is price
cutting tortious? These are the basic issues in the formal debate and some
clarity ought to be introduced with respect to them, if possible. Following a
discussion of these two points, some more generalized objections to the Fair
Trade program will be discussed.
Some precision in the definition of a loss leader would seem to be impor-
134. H. R. REP. No. 382, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. 5 et seq. (1937).
135. SEN. REP. No. 879, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1937).
136. Hearings on S. 100 (1937) ; Hearings on H. R. 1611 (1937).
137. The O'Toole Bill (H. R. 4003, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.) was introduced April 4,
1949 as the latest effort to repeal the Miller-Tydings Act. This bill was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House. A subcommittee of this Committee is cur-
rently conducting hearings under the chairmanship of Congressman Celler of New
York. on the need for further legislation to reinforce the antitrust laws.
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tant,13s because, it is said, all predatory price cutting is accomplished by means
of loss leaders. 139 The Federal Trade Commission made an extensive study
of chain stores and devoted special attention to the use of loss leaders by these
chains. As a definition for the purposes of this study, the Commission adopted
the following: "A loss leader apparently is variously considered as an article
sold below net invoice cost, net purchase cost or net manufacturing cost as the
case may be, or it may be applied to goods sold below the net purchase cost
of the goods plus operating costs, or simply to goods sold below the usual
markup."' 40 A very early definition of an aggressive cutter was "a dealer who
was so designated by 75 % of the local trade at any given place." 141 Compiling
variants of this same species will not be fruitful. A fine logical distinction is
not being made when a responsible citizen, like Senator Tydings, will character-
ize R. H. Macy's as "great believers in predatory price-cutting to take the
trade of these independents away, then when they get it away they can make
it up on something else, or obviously they couldn't stay in business." 142 How-
ever unsatisfactory it may seem, the following definition appears to be the
closest to reality. Speaking of a loss leader, one writer said: "In all probability
it is little more than a derogatory term used by business men to denote any
deep price cuts of which they disapprove." 143
What makes this latter conception of a loss leader appear to be accurate
is the fact that the federal courts have never been persuaded to make price
138. "It is commonly alleged that the chief reason for the urgent necessity of resale
price-fixing legislation is the use of 'loss leaders' in merchandising. No one has ade-
quately defined the term. No one has determined the extent of loss-leader use, however
defined. No one has measured its harmful effects or beneficial effects upon the distrib-
utor and the consuming public. Few distribution problems have been characterized by
more befuddled thinking." Hearings on. H. R. 1611, 151 (1937).
139. See GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION, C. 8 (1939)
for an excellent analysis of leaders and loss leaders. Grether defines a leader "as a
product offered for sale below the price at which it would otherwise have been sold
for the purpose of attracting patronage to other articles in the vendor's general
assembly." Id. at 200. A loss leader is a subclass under leader and is defined by
Grether as "a product offered for sale at a price lower than its invoice or replacement
cost, plus the average expense percentage of the vendor or the particular expense per-
centage allocable to it, on which the loss is expected to be recovered from the patronage
attracted to other articles in the vendor's general assembly." Id. at 201. This is a
reasonable distinction, essentially between good and bad price cutting, but it cannot be
maintained that this distinction is very often made by the proponents of resale price
maintenance. There has been no visible sign that any price cutting would ever be
approved by them.
140. SEN. Doc. No. 51, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1932). Grether claims that because
of this loose definition, the results of the studies of the Commission are of "scant
significance." Grether, op. cit. supra note 139, at 200.
141. Jayne v. Loder, 149 Fed. 21, 24 (3d Cir. 1906).
142. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the District of Columbia
of the Senate on H. R. 3838, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1939). The term "loss leader"
includes a presumption of dishonesty on the part of the retailer using one and a
further presumption of gullibility on the part of any customer going into a retail outlet
because of an advertised low price. Neither of these presumptions seems capable of
proof. See Hearings on H. R. 1611, 89 (1937).
143. Nelson, Trade Practice Conference Rules and the Consumer, 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 452, 460 (1940). The opponents of this legislation do not deny that they use
loss leaders. They simply say that "a customer in the store is worth two in the home."
Hearings on H. R. 1611, 151-52 (1937).
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cutting an unfair competitive practice. 144 Price cutting is only unlawful when
there is a showing that the practice was employed as an instrument of monopoly
power.145 A man in good faith may go into business in competition with another
and cause loss to that other without being liable for the loss so caused, even
though he knew such loss would probably occur.146 It must follow that while
in business he can, in good faith, take such measures as seem reasonably
necessary to stay in business. The qualifying requirement of good faith does
not beg the question. It simply denotes a lack of malice.' 47 For, as the Restate-
ment puts it: "One who engages in a business primarily for the purpose of
causing loss of business to another and with the intention of terminating the
business when that purpose is accomplished is liable to the other for the loss
so caused." 148 It appears then that the federal courts have remained unmoved
throughout this furore over the cutting of prices by "knaves," because this
particular type of knavery seems never to have been unlawful.149 What is
more, they have declared that attempts at resale price maintenance, in the
absence of statute, are unfair competitive practices.150 This was first definitely
established, as previously indicated, in the Beech-Nut decision.15
Besides failing to convince the courts, the proponents of these measures
also failed to convert the larger retailers. In 1929 the Federal Trade Commis-
sion found that 78% of the department stores and 70% of the chain stores
were opposed to resale price maintenance, as contrasted with a 91 % favorable
vote of the regular dealers. 15 2 A few larger department stores, such as Macy's
144. Remington-Rand, Inc., v. Mastercraft Corp., 67 F. 2d 218, 221 (6th Cir.
1933). The Restatement takes the position that drastic price-cutting, a "predatory trade
practice," is not actionable per se, however harsh the price cuts may be. RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 709, comment a (1938).
145. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc., v. United States, 334 U. S. 110, 120-21, 68 Sup.
Ct. 947, 92 L. Ed. 1245 (1948).
146. HOLMlES, THE CoMMON LAW 144-45 (1881); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 708 (1938).
147. The test of predation is intent. OPPENHEIM , CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST
LAWS 75 (1948).
148. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 709 (1938). This section states the principle derived
from the leading case of Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 (1909) (banker
opening a rival barbershop to drive plaintiff out of business gave plaintiff a cause of
action).
149. The reason seems to be that the federal courts have approached resale price
maintenance solely as a problem of restraint of trade. Contrasted with this, the state
courts have emphasized the unfair competition aspects of the problem. OPPENHIIEM,
CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS 383-84 (1948). Doubts continue as to the
existence of an independent federal law of unfair competition. Bunn, The National Law
of Unfair Competition, 62 HARV. L. REV. 987 (1949). Because trademark infringement
is the main type of unfair competition litigation handled by the federal courts, the
federal law continues to emphasize misrepresentation and passing off, elements which
admittedly are not present in price cutting. See Rogers, supra note 94.
150. Armand Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 78 F. 2d 707 (2d Cir. 1935);
Butterick Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 F. 2d 910 (2d Cir. 1925).
151. Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 Sup.
Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307 (1922). See Stevens, Resale Price Maintenance as Unfair Com-
petition, 19 COL. L. REV. 265 (1919).
152. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANC-,
Part 1, 78 (1929) (Hereinafter cited as "FTC REPORT, Part 1 (1929)"). It may also
be found as H. R. Doc. No. 546, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929). A regular dealer ii
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of New York and Filene's of Boston, were among the oldest and most effective
opponents of any legislation to maintain retail prices. They and others made
the following general objections to the laws: (1) the establishment of uniform
prices would deny to the consumer the benefit of operating economies; (2) the
very rigidity of the prices so fixed seriously impaired the possibility of economi-
cal merchandising; (3) the prices would have to be fixed at a level that would
insure higher prices to the consumer; (4) the higher prices would necessarily
include a high cost of national advertising for which the consumer got nothing.
These objections are sufficient to show the tenor of the opposition. The basic
premise of these opposition forces was that at the retail level different prices
may be produced by competition that is not dishonest. The layman is apt to
feel that this is true, and it seems surprising that any discussion is necessary.
When a witness testified that it was impossible to set a price that would fit
both mail-order catalog service and store service, it seemed a reasonable
claim. 15 3 An executive of R. H. Macy's explained that it had been calculated
that giving credit added 6% to the cost of a product and that therefore his
company had decided that Macy's would give no credit and would charge 6%
less than the price set by any other store in the city which gave credit. 54 An-
other example was Namm's Store in Brooklyn, which was in reality two stores.
Upstairs, salesgirls waited upon customers, and credit, delivery, and other
services were rendered; downstairs in the basement, cash payment and self-
service were the basis of substantially lower prices. 155 Is one to believe that
Major Namm was a predatory price cutter downstairs but not upstairs?
It cannot be denied that there are different costs of doing business. The
Fair Traders argue that even if this be true these costs should not be trans-
lated into different retail prices. Besides, as previously pointed out, the Fair
Trade advocate claims that it is the high cost retailer who cuts the most
sharply.156 This contention, however, seems unprovable. A much more sensible
story would be that the most economical operator has the lowest prices. Where-
ever the argument may emerge, it is certain that one principle of the Fair Trade
program is to eliminate competition among retailers. The nature of the pro-
gram in action has yet to be indicated, but this is the true basis of the refusal
to admit the desirability of such competition. As one witness said: "This bill
might also be called . . . a bill to aid the inefficient-to aid the indigent." 157
defined "as an independent retail unit purchasing merchandise from wholesalers or
manufacturers and selling to the consumer." Id. at 73.
153. Hearings on S. 100, 18 (1937). "It is our policy to quote lower prices, where-
ever possible, than asked elsewhere for merchandise of comparable quality. This is
made possible by the economies of our method of doing business." MoNTGOmERY WARD
CATALOG, FALL & WINTER (949-50) 1109 (1949). How predatory price cutting can
,be effected by means of a mail order catalog is difficult to see. There are no loss leaders
to entice the customer to read the catalog. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 115 (1937).
154. Hearings on H. R. 11, 283 (1926).
155. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 102 (1937).
156. Su~pra note 102.
157. Hearings on H. R. 11, 269 (1926).
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The laws not only were based on a blindness to the possibilities of econo-
mies in retailing; they also made such economies harder to make. As previously
mentioned, exemptions from the contract restrictions are almost universally
confined to four situations.158 A trademarked commodity can be sold below the
contract price when the retailer is, in good faith, selling his stock preparatory
to going out of business, when the goods are damaged or deteriorated, when
the sale is by an officer acting under a court order, or when the trademark has
been obliterated. In the Stevens bill of 1914 these were also the sole excep-
tions. As early as 1916 Edward Filene of Boston was already defending
his famous bargain basement, where slow moving stock from the upstairs
store sold at steadily reduced prices for thirty days at which time the unsold
remainder was given to charity.'5 9 Clearance sales are essential to sound mer-
chandising.160 Slow moving and overstocked items must be moved. And yet
such sales cannot be made subject to any uniformity. Items move at different
rates under different selling techniques. Seasonal clearances have been assumed
to be a standard practice to get ready for a new season.16 ' The Fair Trade
laws assume that any clearances of unsalable stock will now be confined to
non-trademarked goods only. Furthermore, newcomers in a neighborhood
have traditionally overcome customer inertia by loudly proclaiming the low
and attractive prices of their new store.162 Under these laws how can obsoles-
cent models or fading styles be cleared out quickly so as to make way for new
varieties? Suppose there is a declining market in which the proper merchan-
dising technique is to slash prices to clear out the high-priced stock. It would,
of course, be no answer to the objections to the entire Fair Trade program
to widen this list of exemptions; but even if it were, it is unlikely that any
such extension would take place, since the whole objective of the movement
is uniformity of prices, and to this end exemptions must perforce be few.
These objections are mentioned to demonstrate further that the problems of
neither the merchandiser nor the manufacturer are being considered with
any sympathy by those favoring these Fair Trade laws. A quantity of unsal-
able goods will not improve the goodwill value of the trademark they bear.
In short, the effort is to put all of the retailers on one level which operates
in favor of the less efficient.
If the whole direction of resale price maintenance must be to favor the
less efficient retailer and to block the use of standard techniques in aggressive
and economical merchandising, then the end result must be that Fair Trade
laws raise prices on Fair Traded goods. Has this been the result in practice?
158. Supra note 19.
159. Hearings before Committee on Interstate and .Foreign Commerce on H. R.
13568, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., Part I, 212 (1916).
160. Hearings on H. R. 11, 252 (1926).
161. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 109 (1937).
162. Id. at 111.
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For a long time the answer to this question was unknown. 163 A few admittedly
incomplete studies are now available that show the answer to be indisputably
in the affirmative. In California, in 1934, the contract prices for drug items
were 33% higher than the prices advertised on these same commodities in the
newspapers during the first six months of 1933.164 The 1945 investigation of
the Federal Trade Commission gave the same general result. The manufac-
turers set their contract prices between the two extremes of the prevailing
prices with the result that in the retail grocery trade, for instance, "price
increases most often were shown by cash-and-carry stores while price de-
creases were shown most often by credit and delivery stores." 165 The Report
then points out that price increases "fell most heavily upon those consumers who
from necessity or personal choice patronize minimum-service stores." In the
retail drug trade the same situation developed, and the chain stores and de-
partment stores are found raising their prices. 166 The two studies heretofore
mentioned exhaust the reliable data on the subject at the present writing.
A thought that might not occur to the ordinary consumer is one contended
for by the proponents of these laws. An authoritative spokesman for this
group points out the danger of inferring that "the sole objective of public
policy was to obtain the lowest possible price to the consumer on every com-
modity. This is both an economic fallacy and a misconception of law. The
public is more interested in fair and reasonable prices which preserve the
economic balance and advantages to those engaged in the trade, with due regard
to the consuming public, than it is in securing the lowest obtainable prices,
when the inevitable tendency is to degrade or drive from the market 'articles
which it is assumed to be desirable that the public should be able to get.'" 167
This rhay explain the apparent subversion of the economic basis of our society
by the advocates of these measures and should all the more stir the consumer
to reassert his traditional belief that in a competitive society the objective is the
best goods at the lowest prices. 168
If trademarked goods which are subjected to resale price maintenance
163. "In the absence of definite experience" the Federal Trade Commission polled
various business groups as to what they expected from legalized resale price mainte-
nance. FTC REPORT, Part 2, c. 5 (1931). The conclusion reached at that time by the
Commission was that "Neither injury is capable of exact measurement, but, in the
opinion of the commission, the potential damage to consumers through price fixing
would be much greater than any existing damage to producers through this form of
price cutting." Id. at 165.
164. Grether, Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation Restricting
Price Cutting, 24 CALIF. L. ZEv. 640 (1936). Additional material on increases in Cali-
fornia and other Pacific states is in GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER 'FAIR TRADE
LFiSLATIoN 298 (1939).
165. FTC REPORT xlvi (1945).
166. Id. at xlviii et seq.
167. Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 174, 4 S. E. 2d 528, 125 A. L. R.
1308 (1939). The quote within the quotation is from the dissent of Justice Holmes in
the Dr. Miles case, 220 U. S. 373, 412, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 55 L. Ed. 502 (1911).
168. One of our official economists described resale price maintenance as an "im-
pediment to low-price policies." NOURSE, PRICE MAKING IN A DEalocRAcy 161 (1944).
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contracts rise to a higher general level of selling price, they must also then
rise to a higher price as compared with unbranded goods or with goods whose
brand does not have to bear the cost of a national advertising campaign. A
reputable recent study has borne this out by a demonstration that the prices of
nationally advertised brands are materially higher than those of virtually iden-
tical merchandise which is unbranded or which bears a distributor's private
label. 16 9 It was always Macy's contention that resale price maintenance would
not injure it because the day any law was passed affecting prices, Macy's in-
tended to use its own unfettered brands.17 0 The witnesses who spoke for
Macy's always made a great show of producing Macy's trademarked articles
and comparing them with products bearing nationally advertised brands, dem-
onstrating that the two were the same and that the article of Macy's was sold
at a substantially lower price. 17 Another effect of advertising is to emphasize
prices. If an item is nationally known as a nickel item, the producers are al-
most trapped into maintaining the five-cent price regardless of the vicissitudes
of the business cycle. The way out, of course, is to maintain the price but
vary the size and quality of the same article. And it has been a common com-
plaint that these changes have been made without notice. 72
This emphasis upon price serves to introduce an example of the incon-
clusiveness of some of the arguments that have raged over resale price main-
tenanc. One of the founders of the American Fair Trade League and one
of the oldest supporters of the movement was William Ingersoll, whose dol-
lar watch is part of our cultural history. Ingersoll always claimed price cut-
ting ruined his watch business. 73 At the 1926 hearings, the Macy witness re-
jected this claim and said that the changing price structure had simply made
it impossible any longer to turn out profitably a dollar watch. 174 It is evident
that it would not be possible to determine the relative merits of this particular
controversy, but it does focus attention on one point: How many manufacturers
have been hurt by predatory price cutting? A definitive reply to this question
is the statement of the Federal Trade Commission that it had "been at some
pains to find instances of such price cutting which were sufficiently severe to
result in a permanent and material reduction of the manufacturers' volume of
business, but without discovering any instances in which it could be satisfac-
torily shown that decreased volume was primarily due to dealer price cut
169. NELSON AND KEIm, PRICE BEHAVIOR AND BUSINESS PoLIcY 368 et seq. (TNEC
Monograph 1, 1940).
170. Hearings on H. R. 11, 265 (1926). Macy's today has over 1400 of its own branded
products. The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, FORTUNE 166 (Jan. 1949). See Nounss, op. cit.
supra note 167, at 250.
171. Hearings on H. R. 11, 290 (1926).
172. Id. at 271; Hearings on H. R. 1611, 188 (1937) (Palmolive soap the same price
but half the size).
173. Hearings on H. R. 11, 39 (1926).
174. Id. at 250.
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ting." 175 In all the hearings examined only two manufacturers ever reported
that they themselves had been hurt by price cutting.17 6 All other testimony
must be regarded as hearsay.
With this final statement on the rebuttal of the formal case for resale
price maintenance, it is best to turn to more fruitful fields of investigation. It
should be clear that these claims and counterclaims have not been entirely of
a statistical character. Much work remains to be done, particularly in publiciz-
ing the facts. But even this would not be sufficient, because, as we shall now
see, the character of the movement has so changed that the whole debate has
been rendered theoretical.
FAIR TRADE AND A COMPETITIVE ECON011Y
Several articles have been written in recent years pointing out or de-
ploring the withdrawal from a thoroughgoing conception of competition that
is embodied in the Miller-Tydings Act. This exception to the Sherman Act
represents a reversal of policy; it has been criticized as an unjustified re-
versal. 177 Prices are the primary regulating material in our economy, and one
objective of the antitrust laws was to prevent man-made obstacles to their free
formation. 78 Price fixing, reasonable or unreasonable, is unlawful per se.17 9 If
competition must be preserved by regulating laws, a paradox must be evident
when a law is passed which allegedly assists in the preservation of competi-
tion by eliminating so much price competition at the retail level.'8 0 This is
not the place to defend a competitive economy. We are officially committed to
such a business philosophy.' 8' But one of the most pernicious effects of the
Fair Trade legislative program could be the creation of the belief that -the
gradual elimination of the harsh realities of the competitive business life was
intended in the passage of laws such as these and that there has been an in-
tent to soften the rigors of such a life by a modified form of competition.
The President's Council of Economic Advisers recently spoke of "the
175. FTC REPORT, Part 2, 4 (1931).176. Hearings on H. R. 13568, 46th Cong., 2d Sess. 586 (1917) ; Hearings on H. R.
11, 39 (1926).
177. Letter of W. A. Ayres, Chairman of the FTC, dated April 14, 1937, to the
President. 81 CONG. REc. 7490 (1937) ; LOEViXGER, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE 109,
283 (1949).
178. See Judge Rifkind's remarks in Stenographer's Minutes of United States v.
National Lead Co. 3873 (S. D. N. Y. Oct. 2, 1945).
179. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U. S. 707, 720, 64 Sup. Ct. 805,
88 L. Ed. 1024 (1944) ; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 223, 60
Sup. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940). See Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CALIF. L. REv. 297, 667 (1940).
180. Note, "Preservation of Competition" through Federal Antitrust Laws, 51 HARV.
L. REv. 694, 700 (1938).
181. "It is not for us, however, to pick and choose between competing business and
economic theories in applying this law [Sherman Act]. Congress has made that choice.
It has declared that the rule of trade and commerce should be competition, not combina-
tion." Douglas, J., in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173, 187, 65
Sup. Ct. 254, 89 L. Ed. 160 (1944).
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tendency toward soft competition" and gave as an example the Miller-Tydings
Act. The Council then went on to say that "The philosophy of the Sherman
Act appears to be yielding to a policy of 'ethical competition' which does not
differentiate between the stability of the individual firm and the stability of
the total economy." 182 This seems to mean that competition will now be tem-
pered so that nobody need go out of business because of it. The technique used
to secure the passage of the Miller-Tydings Act repudiates the thesis that we
need not regard this Act as any intentional modification of our traditions. The
Act is an aberration, fostered and propelled by a minority pressure group. It
will die because of the weakness of its internal structure; but for the good of
the body politic and economic, it should be killed, swiftly and definitely.
And now the narrative returns to the point at which it began, to that little
band of wilful men-the National Association of Retail Druggists. This As-
sociation was founded in 1898. The guiding principle of the organization from
that date has been that every retail druggist should get a 33 1/3% markup as
a minimum on each item that he sells. 183 This principle was put into action in
a program which consisted of agreements with manufacturers and wholesalers
to fix prices, maintenance of blacklists of aggressive retail price cutters who
refused to maintain the agreed upon prices, boycotts of unwilling manufac-
turers, and other methods designed to reach the same results. In 1906othe
United States petitioned for equitable relief against such activities in the Cir-
cuit Court in Indiana. Exactly one year later complete relief in a very broad
and inclusive decree was granted. 84 This judgment has never been vacated.
As pointed out previously, the association supported every effort to get
Congress to pass national legislation authorizing resale price maintenance con-
tracts. Its first apparent success on the national level, however, was achieved
in the retail codes of the N. R. A. The California acts of 1931 and 1933 were
the work of the Northern California Retail Druggists Association, but in 1935
the N. A. R. D. undertook to push Fair Trade laws through the remaining
states. The Association first drafted a model statute, which most of the states
later adopted. The California statute, which was followed by the states enact-
ing laws in 1935 and 1936, authorizes contracts which hold the line "at the
price stipulated by the vendor." The N. A. R. D.'s statute avoids the charge of
price-fixing by authorizing contracts which forbid resale "at less than the
minimum price stipulated by the seller." 185 It is no mere coincidence that this
182. THIRD ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE COUNCIL OF ECONOM1IC
ADVISERS 15 (1948).
183. FTC REPORT 142 (1945).
184. United States v. National Association of Retail Druggists (C. C. Ind. May 9,
1907). The complaint in this case does not appear to be publicly available, but the decree
is reprinted in DECRzES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES, JULY 2, 1890-
JANUARY 1, 1918, 115 (1918).
185. The variations in the two types of this statute are discussed in ZORN AND FELD-
MfAN, BUSINESS UNDER THE NEW PRICE LAWS 297 (1937). The variations in the statutes
of all the states are classified in FTC REPORT 70 et seq. (1945).
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latter type of contract alone is exempted from the Sherman Act by the Miller-
Tydings Act.
The Association adopted the technique that had been so successfully used
in California-the '"Captain Plan." 186 Under this plan a state would be divided
up into districts, in each of which an active and aggressive druggist was elected
as captain to keep alive the interest of the other druggists in the progress of
the movement. This system, promoted with vigor, had an astounding legisla-
tive success. Bills were pushed through state legislatures so quickly that typo-
graphical errors in the California statute were embodied in the statutes of
seven other states which copied that statute. 8 7 There were no hearings at all
on the bills in Illinois, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. No hearings were held
in New York until the bill had already passed the legislature. 88
Once the state bills had been passed, the next task was to get the manu-
facturers to "fair trade" their products. The most famous incident in this
campaign was the experience of the Pepsodent Company. In 1935 this com-
pany, upon advice of counsel, decided to discontinue its resale price mainte-
nance in California. 8 9 Sales of the company's products thereupon practically
ceased. The retail druggists of that state seemed to know what to do with the
Pepsodent products. "They put them in the basement. Some were enthusiastic
enough to throw them into the ash can." 1 0 The company quickly capitulated*
and renegotiated the contracts. It also donated $25,000 to the National As-
sociation of Retail Druggists to be used to further the campaign for resale price
maintenance. The California druggists then put on a special drive for Pepso-
dent products, lost ground was recovered for the company, and everybody
seems to have been made happy-without any polling of the consumers. 191
The activities of the Association next were devoted to the passage of na-
tional legislation. The bills which eventually became the Miller-Tydings Act
were then being considered in Congress. The Journal of the Association gave
explicit instructions as to the proper procedure to be followed to ensure pas-
sage of these bills through Congress. It was advised that "At least one thou-
sand communications should be placed in the hands of each of these Senators
[on the Judiciary Committee] when the call comes from Washington. No
threatening statements should be included, but the letter should be written in
the strongest possible language. Stress the plight of the small man in business
186. Described in GRETHER, PRICE CONTROL UNDER THE FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION- 97(1939) ; FTC REPORT 144 (1945).
187. GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 186, at i9.
188. FTC REPORT 56 (1945). This fact was pointed out in the hearings on the Miller-
Tydings Act. Hearinqs on S. 100, 12 (1937).
189. For the reason that shipments were being made from Chicago and therefore that
the Fair Trade contracts were covering goods traveling in interstate commerce, which coun-
sel advised was unlawful. GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 186, at 99.
190. FTC REPORT 143 (1945).
191. GRETHER, op. cit. supra note 186, at'99-100.
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and the fact that he is numerically supreme at the polls." 192 As the campaign
developed every loyal member of the Association was urged to write his Con-
gressman every week. 19 3 And finally, when the bill had pa:,sed through Con-
gress, another call came: "I earnestly urge you to deluge the President with
telegrams, urging that he sign the bill at once and make it a law." 194
The Congress had had warning that this was a pressure group movement,
both in the hearings,19 5 and in the report from the House committee. Con-
gressman Celler had filed a separate report on the bill in which he had warned
against the combination of the people who were supporting this bill in order
to secure higher prices.196 In fact, Congressman Celler at the hearings had
told about the N. A. R. D.'s goal of a 33 1/3% markup, but Senator Tydings
had rejected the notion of such a retailers' combination. 197
But our latter-day Cassandra, Congressman Celler, was ignored, and the
bill was passed. The Association then settled down to making it effective. Two
years later an unsuccessful attempt was made to secure a Fair Trade law for
the District of Columbia. But as Fortine recently said, Congressmen have no
interest in higher prices for the District. 98 The hearings on that bill, however,
told of boycotts against reluctant manufacturers and against newspapers that
expressed disapproval of the Fair Trade movement.1 19 These activities con-
tinued, and two years later an imaginative law*review editor wrote of col-
lective bargaining by retailers to secure their desired markups.20 This writer
pointed out that these combinations of retailers were horizontal agreements
which had not been exempted from the. operation of the Sherman Act by the
Miller-Tydings Act. However, it was not until early in 1942 that the Jus-
tice Department moved against the N. A. R. D. to restrain its bludgeoning ac-
tivities. In the space of one year three criminal actions were begun under
similar indictments. The defendants in these actions included the National
Association of Retail Druggists, 201 various state pharmaceutical associa-
tions, 20 2 and the National Wholesale Druggists Association. 203
The indictment against the retail druggists charged a violation of Section
192. Cited in TNEC HEARINGS, Part 8, 3368, 3461 (1939).
193. Id. at 3368, 3462.
194. Id. at 3463.
195. Hearings on H. R. 1611, 118 (1937); Hearings on S. 100, 22 (1937).
196. H. R. REP. No. 382, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 et seq. (1937).
197. Hearings on S. 100, 5-6 (1937).
198. The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, FORTUNE 70 (Jan. 1949).
199. Hearings before Subcon nittee of the Comnmittee on the District of Coiumbia
of the Senate on H. R. 3838, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1939).
200. Note, Collective Bargaining by Retailers Under the Fair Trade Acts, 8 U. OF
CHI. L. REv. 745 (1941).
201. United States v. National Association of Retail Druggists, No. 683c (Criminal)
(N. J., indictment returned Mar. 26, 1942).
202. United States v. New York State Pharmaceutical Association, No. C-114-75
(S. D. N. Y., indictment returned Mar. 4, 1943).
203. United States v. National Wholesale Druggists Association, No. 618c (Criminal)
(N. J., indictment returned Feb. 6, 1942).
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1 of the Sherman Act by the formation of a combination and conspiracy to
raise, fix and maintain the retailers' margin of profit on drugstore items by
first fixing the price among themselves and then, according to the second
count of the indictment, "persuading, inducing, and compelling producers to
enter into and maintain agreements fixing prices." The means used upon these
producers were the urging of specific wholesale prices, persuasively expressing
disapproval of such sales devices as combination deals, boycotting noncomply-
ing producers, disciplining retailers who although members of the Association
did not actively promote these policies, and pressing producers to sue or
threaten to sue retailers who violated the Fair Trade acts. The Captain Plan
was mentioned as a method used to effectively organize the individual retailers
to carry out these policies. These drug associations pleaded nolo contendere 204
and were punished by fines.20
5
This brief survey of the activities of one aggressive retail association
was designed to show the pressure group character of the Fair Trade laws.2 0 6
The evidence was clear by 1937 that retailers were pressuring these laws.2 0 7
That is why, in retrospect, Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Old Dear-
born case seems like "reminiscing about resale price maintenance when it
was young, fresh, and fair." 208 Further, because this is a pressure group
operation, because the hearings on these laws in the states have been so scanty,
and because 'accurate information concerning the operation of these laws has
been both meagre and difficult to get, it can hardly be claimed that this whole
program represents a considered exemption to our basic philosophy of a com-
petitive economy.
It is because no modification of our attitude towards competition has been
contemplated that a powerful feeling is growing against resale price mainte-
204. Equivalent to a plea of guilty. See Lenvin and Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its,
Nature and Implications, 51 YALE L. J. 1255 (1942).
205. In the N. A. R. D. case, the charges against the individuals were dismissed, and
the defendant associations were fined a total of $15,250 (Jan. 29, 1947). In the case
against the New York Association, charges against the individuals were dismissed, and
the corporate defendants were fined a total of $17,500 (Jan. 28, 1947).
206. Lest it be thought that the movement has slackened in -its force, the story of
Fortune Magazie's tiff should be told. In the January, 1949, issue, the editors undertook
an examination of the Fair Trade movement and came to an unfavorable conclusion. The
article declared that: "The United States is not yet committed to the idea that all members
of a competitive economy must be legally safeguarded against all the hazards of competi-
tions." The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, FORTUNE, 70, 166 (Jan. 1949). The flood of invective,
personal abuse and general criticism that was directed at the editors following the publica-
tion of the article caused the editors to re-examine-and reaffirm-their position. The
"Fair" Trade Controversy, FORTUNE 75 (April, 1949).
207. LYNcH, THE Co NcENTRATON OF EcoNoMic POWER 149 (1946) seems to dispute
this. See also Grether, Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in Relation to the Control of
Price Competition, 4 LAW & CoNTE1mP. PROB. 375, 384 n. 14 (1937).
208. Schulman, The Fair Trade Acts and the Law of Restrictive Agreements Affecting
Chattels, 49 YALE L. J. 607, 615 (1940). The retailers enlisted "the support for this purpose
of an irrelevant and even misleading, though nevertheless powerful and effective, theory."
Id. at 616. Justice Sutherland's opinion "is to a considerable degree divorced from th6
economic realities." Note, Compulsory Resale Price Maintenance in Liquor: A New York
Experiment in Controlled Competition, 57 YALE L. J. 459, 470 n. 45 (1948).
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nance. When the T. N. E. C. asked Thurman Arnold, then Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, for recommendations as to legisla-
tion required to make the antitrust laws more effective, the second item on his
list was a recommendation for the repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act.200 He
claimed that the Act had become a cloak for conspiracies in restraint of trade
that could not be considered within its scope. This appears to be the main basis
for the Federal Trade Commission's disapproval of resale price maintenance. 210
In addition to the horizontal combinations at the retail level so as to unite
retailers against manufacturers to ensure adequate price margins, 21' the whole
program conduces toward horizontal combinations at the manufacturer level
to make uniform the prices of competing brands before they are fixed by Fair
Trade contracts. 212
Another approach to avoiding combinations in restraint of trade is to be
on guard that no little oases exit within our price structure that are not subject
to price competition. 213 When the T. N. E. C. recommended the repeal of the
Miller-Tydings Act 214 it specifically objected to the effect of the Act in in-
troducing rigidities into the pricing of certain goods. Singling out of trade-
marked goods for this doubtful blessing has been objected to 216 now that it
is clear that the protection of the manufacturers' goodwill is "an elaborate fic-
tion" 216 urged in defense of the Act. But the main objection is not to the
piecemeal approach of the movement but to the presence of any fixed element
-within our economy. 217 The recent experience of Great Britain presents an
example of the strangling effect of politically fixed costs and the enormous
difficulty to be encountered in changing them. If the resale price maintenance
movement is to be regarded, at present, as a political problem, and we have
rejected the idea that it represents a considered innovation to our economic
209. TNEC FINAL REPORT 121 (1941).
210. FTC REPORT lxiv (1945).
211. In United. States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293, 65 Sup. Ct. 661,
89 L. Ed. 951 (1945), retailers and wholesalers combined to force producers into making
fair trade contracts which established artificially high and non-competitive markups. A
boycott was arranged in case of non-compliance. This was held an illegal arrangement.
212. See memorandum of Corwin Edwards, TNEC FINAL REPORT 248 (1941).
213. Among the effects of a non-competitive price structure are (1) the consumer is
priced out of the market or is forced to pay higher prices, (2) there is a waste of resources
represented by the encouragement of an excessive number of outlets, and (3) competition
in advertising is stimulated, and this adds further to costs. Note, Compisor~y Resalc Price
Maintenance in Liquor: A New York Experiment in Controlled Competilion, 57 YALE
L. J. 459, 471-72 (1948).
214. TNEC FINAL REPORT 33 (1941).
215. LOEVINGER, THE LAW OF FREE ENTERPRISE 283 (1949). There is a strong posi-
tion that the monopoly elements of a patent and a trademark are the same. CHAMBERLIN,
THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPErITION 56 ct seq. (1938). Why then permit for a
trademark what is denied to a patent? Another unreasonable classification is the protec-
tion of distributors from price competition and not the manufacturers. EDWARDS, MAINTAIN-
ING ComPET IT o 73 (1949).
216. Corwin Edwards in TNEC FINAL REPORT 244 (1941).
217. Price rigidities may, under special circumstances, be introduced to combat in-
flation.-See Taft, Basic Concepts of Price Control and the Sherman Antitrust Act, 11
GEo. WASH. L..REV. 191 (1943).
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philosophy, then political courage must be fostered and this one problem, at
least, removed.
As a conclusion, some wise remarks seem appropriate. They were written
in 1916 by Professor Taussig of Harvard University:
"The case in favor of resale price maintenance is not made out. There is no public
gain from giving an article an outward appearance of special merit. There is still less
a public gain from compelling retail dealings to be conducted in the good old way and
at the good old expense .... Let the retailer sell as he sees fit, and continue to trust
in the efficacy of competition for cheapening the methods of distribution, and in the
good sense of the purchasing public for assuring to them goods of the kind they really
want, and at the prices which are really advantageous." 218
218. Hearing on H. R. 13568, Part 2, 266-74 (1916). This is believed to be the same
as Taussig, Price Maintenance, 6 AMER. EcoN. REv. 170 (1916), which was not available
to the writer.
